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Operation Market Garden began on the 17th of September 1944. It was a coordinated action by American, British a Polish Airborne and mainly British forces. The operation began with heavy air raids, in order to weaken any resistance. The paratroopers began landing at 13.00hrs around targets in the Netherlands, chiefly Eindhoven, Arnhem and Nijmegen.<ref> Devlin, Gerard M.. ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0860510689/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0860510689&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=649bb9080e6f13f739965427274aedcb Paratrooper: The Saga Of Parachute And Glider Combat Troops During World War II]''. Robson Books, NY, 1979), p. 117</ref>. The paratroopers had the advantage of surprise and they achieved their objectives. The Germans had been taken completely by surprise. The initial phase of the operation was a total success. It had been feared that the Germans would blow up the bridges and this would mean that the plan would have to be aborted. The rapid capture of the bridges meant that the ground forces would be able to reach the landing zones, and support the paratroopers.<ref>Devlin, p. 119</ref>

The British ground forces fought their way to Nijmegen and captured the city, after some fierce fighting. One after another the bridges were captured by the British Ground forces. The operation appeared to be going to plan despite heavier than anticipated German resistance. The most important bridge was Arnhem, this was the most strategically significant bridge and it had to be seized by the ground forces if Market Garden was to succeed in its objectives. The British paratroopers had captured the bridge but they soon came under fierce attack from units of the crack 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions.<ref> Hastings, Max, ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0330490621/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0330490621&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=6206158efce5c001fc4abbbb9e1291a3 Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944–45]'' (London: Pan Books, 2004), p.123</ref>. The SS had armor and tanks and they pounded the British paratroopers mercilessly.

The British paratroopers soon found themselves surrounded as the SS had encircled them. The lightly armed British soldiers fought bravely, but they could not hold out for long. An elite British unit, the Irish Guards, was fighting its way forward to help the airborne troops. However, because of the terrain , they had to fight their way up to Arnhem on a single road and they were constantly attacked. This road came to be known as the Highway to Hell. The tanks of the Guards could not leave the narrow road as the ground was very marshy and much of it was bog landbogland. As the Irish Guards made their way to Arnhem they were easily picked off by the Germans, who attacked them from the cover of woodland. Eventually, such was the ferocity of the German resistance that the British came to a halt. The paratroopers at Arnhem were isolated and cut-off and were forced to surrender. Operation Market Garden had achieved all of its objectives, except the most important one, the capture of the Bridge at Arnhem.<ref>Hastings, p. 135</ref>

Even before the start of the operation, many feared that Montgomery’s plan was too optimistic. The commander of the Polish airborne unit declared that the plan was flawed and famously stated that the prime objective of the offensive the Arnhem Bridge was ‘a bridge too far.’<ref> Ryan, p 89</ref> He meant that Montgomery’s aims were simply too ambitious and that he was asking too much of his men. Montgomery also assumed that the paratroop unit could retain their landing zones and the bridges for a given period of time. Paratroops were only lightly armed and without support from ground troops and tanks they could not hold out for long. The British General, was wrong to believe that airborne troops could resist assault from ground troops supported by armor for several days.

Crucially Montgomery, failed to understand the terrain that he expected his men to fight in. The roads in the Netherlands were narrow and that the ground around them was unsuitable for armor. This was a fundamental error- Montgomery had simply assumed that his tanks could make their way rapidly to the landing zones, by using only the roads. During the battle, the roads became death traps for many British units and they soon became clogged with burned -out tanks and vehicles and this critically delayed the ground forces coming to the support of the paratroopers in Arnhem, in particular. Perhaps the biggest failing of the Montgomery plan was that it assumed that the Germans had been decisively beaten and that any counter-attack that they could launch in the area would be limited.<ref>Montgomery, p. 178</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-J27784,_Arnheim,_Walter_Model,_Heinz_Harmel.jpg|thumbnail|225px|General Walter Model with SS-Brigadeführer Heinz Harmel]] The Germans had been driven back some two hundred miles in a matter of weeks. The British and the Americans dominated the skies and constantly harassed the Germans. The roads had become very unsafe for the Germans and they had also come under attack from the local resistance movements. The Germans had lost some 90,000 killed or wounded during the summer of 1944 and a further 200,000 had been taken prisoner or missing in action.<ref> Ryan, p. 1, 45</ref> However, after the failure of the British army to encircle the German army in the Scheldt Estuary , allowed the Germans time to regroup in the Netherlands. The German front had begun to stabilize. They were also ably led by the very experienced General Walter Model. He also received some reinforcements in the form of the remaining units of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions. Unfortunately, for the Allies, especially the British, the SS units were positioned in Arnhem. This was not merely bad luck, but due to good German intelligence.<ref>Hastings, p. 119</ref>

The Germans had anticipated that there would be an offensive launched with the objective of seizing Arnhem, Wesel , and Nijmegen. A senior intelligence officer argued that the British and the American would use airborne troops. However, he did not predict where the assault would be. Nevertheless, German intelligence was able to provide the High Command with the information they needed to prepare for any planned Allied attack. The German General Model heeded his intelligence officers and this was to prove decisive. The British had excellent intelligence.<ref> Ryan, p. 45</ref> They had reliable information on the movements of the Germans, from the Dutch Resistance and they could also employ aerial reconnaissance planes to obtain photographic intelligence. One reconnaissance mission was able to provide images that seemed to show German forces in the Arnhem area. This was confirmed by information from the local resistance. This was compelling proof that the Germans had significant forces and that any air assault on the region, would be a great risk.

The intelligence officer who reported this to Montgomery was not believed. When he tried to persuade Montgomery that there was a large build-up of German forces near Arnhem, he was relieved of his command and rumors spread that he had a nervous breakdown. Montgomery’s refusal to heed intelligence was to result in a near disaster for the British. It appears that the General, refused to countenance anything that contradicted his views as he was utterly convinced of the brilliance of his plans for Market Garden and his own infallibility.<ref> Harclerode, p. 127</ref>