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→Cement territorial and political gains at Yalta
The western allies, especially Churchill, did not like what Stalin proposed and saw it as opportunistic. However, they reluctantly agreed to Stalin's demands as they needed to keep the alliance strong in order to decisively defeat the Third Reich. <ref>Roberts, Geoffrey, <i>[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0300112041/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0300112041&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=9b12c40f73ceb88f68fa490cbc8bc9ae Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953]</i>. (Yale University Press, Yale, 2006), p. 156</ref> In accordance with decisions taken at the Tehran Conference, in May 1944 joint Britain and US troops launched an invasion of France, opening the so-called “second front” in the West. Their actions allowed the Soviet Union to make significant advances across Eastern Europe toward Germany. In particular, they advanced upon the territories that they had lost during the German invasion. The end of the war was near and the changing geopolitical situation, especially in Europe meant that it was time for another meeting of the Allies. <ref> Roberts, p. 145</ref>
===Cement territorial and political gains at Yalta===
[[File: Yalta 1.jpg|thumbnail|300px|left|Soviet soldiers in Berlin in 1945]]
The Yalta Conference took place in February 1945. This was the second wartime meeting of the “Big Three” the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, and US President Franklin Roosevelt). Each brought his own agenda to the Yalta Conference. The British wanted to maintain their empire, the Soviets wished to secure and obtain more land and secure positions in their new zones of influence and interests, and the US wanted to ensure the Soviet’s entry into the Pacific war and discuss postwar settlement.<ref> Geoffery Roberts, "Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences," <i>Journal of Cold War Studies</i> 9:4 (Fall 2007): 6-40</ref> From the very opening, Stalin made it clear that his demands regarding Poland were not negotiable: the Soviets were to gain “their territory” from the eastern portion of Poland. Poland was to compensate for that by extending its Western borders, thereby forcing out millions of Germans. Negotiators even signed a declaration forcing the Polish to provide inclusion of Soviet Communists in their postwar national government.<ref>Roberts, p. 245 </ref>
Furthermore, the Big Three agreed to require Germany’s unconditional surrender and ratified their agreements regarding NAZI Germany postwar division: there were to be four zones of occupation, one zone for each of the three dominant nations plus one zone for France. Berlin itself, although within the Soviet zone, would also be divided into four sectors, and would eventually become a major symbol of the Cold War socialists-capitalists separation due to the infamous Berlin Wall, which was constructed and maintained by the Soviets.
The Soviets led by Stalin were keen on regaining lost territories and Yalta Conference was their best chance to do that. As a result, Stalin even agreed to enter the Pacific war against Japan in exchange for more territories granted, including portions of Sakhalin, Port Arthur, Manchurian railroads and the Kurile Islands<ref> Roberts,p 38</ref>. However, already in poor health, President Roosevelt failed to acknowledge Stalin’s true objectives. Roosevelt readily met Stalin’s conditions, since the Soviets eventually agreed to join the United Nations and Pacific war. The two leaders even secretly negotiated a voting formula with a veto power granted solely to the permanent members on the UN Security Council, providing themselves with more control in the world affairs and greatly weakening the UN power in the oncoming disputes. Overall, Roosevelt and the other Allies felt confident that Yalta had been successful. Nevertheless, the true Conference winner was once again Joseph Stalin <ref>Plokhii, Serhii. <i>[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0670021415/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0670021415&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=395fe063e5a59ca43bf5fc51b1cf3924 Yalta: The Price of Peace]</i>. New York, NY: Viking Press, NY, 2010), p. 145</ref>.
==Post war doctrines, conference reactions and consequences==