==French Tactics and Equipment were Poor==
THE French military tactics were very poorextremely outdated at the start of the war. They had failed to recognize that warfare had fundamentally changed since the First World War. They were over-reliant upon the Maginot Line and they believed that this would stop any German invasion in its track and such would be their casualties . Since they did not believe that could defeat Germany outright, they hoped that the Maginot would enter into negotiationsdrive up casualties and Germany to the negotiating table. They relied on defensive tactics and failed to grasp the impact of modern tanks and aircraft. This over-reliance on the Maginot Line meant that they were too defensive. The French Maginot Line also failed to understand that the Maginot Line was inadequate and it did not extend to protect the entire French border with . Instead of attacking France directly, Germany avoided the Maginot line by invading Belgium. French military planners has failed to plan for this contingency. The defensive line only partially defended France and indeed left the country open to an invasion via Belgium. Typical of the defensive mentality of the The French High Command was that they also failed to launch an offensive against Germany when after the German Army was fighting in attacked Poland. The French army simply waited hid behind the Maginot Line and waited for the Germans to attack. When the Germans finally did attack through the Ardennes the French army stationed was trapped in bunkers and its fortifications were immediately outflanked. Even when the Germans invaded Belgium, the French General Staff continued with their cautious policy and were slow to respond to the German threat .<ref> Cooper, M. ''The German Army 1933–1945, Its Political and Military Failure''. Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein and Day, 1978), p. 201 </ref> While the French army was large and had been well resourced, it had not been modernized. It was still based on the idea that the next war would resemble the Great War. As a result, the French did not believe that any war with Germany, would be a mobile one, but would rather be a war of attrition. This meant that they failed to develop their tank formations and did not understand how tanks could be effectively used in a quick offensive assault.<ref> Copper, p, 137</ref>. During the invasion, German Panzer tanks quickly overcame the French defenses on the plains of Northern France. The French air forces were also not a match for the Germans in aerial combat. The French army was unable to cope with the German Blitzkrieg tactics and was quickly defeated after only six weeks of fighting.<ref> Copper, p, 134</ref>
The French army was large and had been well resourced. However, it had not been modernized. It was still based on the idea that the next war would be like WW I. As a result, the French did not believe that any war with Germany, would be a mobile one, but would rather be a war of attrition, a repeat of WWI. This meant that they failed to develop their tank formations, in particular<ref> Copper, p, 137</ref>. This meant that the German Panzer tanks were able to quick and powerful and quickly overcame the French on the plains of Northern France. The French also neglected their air force and many of their planes were not match for the Germans in aerial combat. The French army was unable to cope with the German Blitzkrieg tactics and therefore defeated in less than six weeks <ref> Copper, p, 134</ref>.
==Poor Military and Political Leadership==
In 1940 the French general staff was led by General Maurice Gamelan, an officer widely respected. A veteran and war hero of the First World War, he was credited developing the strategy that led to the decisive French victory at the Marne in 1914. He had also tried unsuccessfully, to modernize the army. But Gamelin was suffering from a serious illness, whose symptoms included poor concentration levels, memory loss and other cognitive difficulties Gamelin’s own memoirs, published after the war showed symptoms of paranoia and delusions of grandeur <ref> Jackson, Julian T. The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940. Oxford UP, 2003), p. 234</ref>.. The military leadership below Gamelin was generally poor. They were slow to respond to the Germans and there was a marked reluctance to take the initiative and go on the attack. The political leadership of France was also very poor. According to one French commentator during the war, they could not inspire the French people, they were more interested in fighting among themselves that the Germans<ref>Jackson, p 235</ref>.
