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This article will discuss the The Battle of Stalingrad in WWII. This battle, between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, is rightly considered as one of not only the most important in World War II, if not but one of the most important in all of military history. The battle proved to be decisive for the Soviet Union and fundamentally changed altered the fortunes course of the war. Germany's defeat at Stalingrad led not only lead to catastrophic German losses and from then on , but put the Nazi war machine was on the defensivefor he rest of the war. This article will examine the reasons for Why were the Germans defeat defeated at the Battle of Stalingrad and identify the factors in what lead to the Soviet victory. ? The work will argue that the German defeat at Stalingrad was a result of hobbled by Hitler's micromanaging and tactics, his personal intransigence , poor German battlefield leadership and . The Soviet's benefitted from superior Soviet leadership, numbers, and tactics.

In June 1940, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. It was a surprise attack and it was contrary to a secret that violated the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty, agreed signed in 1939 between Germany and the Soviet Union, in 1939. The Ribbentrop-Molotov agreeement was a non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Communist Soviet Union and it that was intended to ensure that neither country attacked the other.<ref> Antill, Peter, ''Stalingrad 1942'' (Osprey Publishing, London, 2007), p. 18</ref> Up to one million German soldiers and their allies pushed into the west of the western Soviet Union on the first day of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. As a result of their tactical surprise, the German army achieved a serious series of spectacular victories. The Germans despite Despite heroic Soviet resistance , Germany seized much of present day Belorussia, Ukraine and the Baltic States.<ref> Bellamy, Chris, ''Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War''. New York: Alfred A. Knopf & Random House.2007), p. 23</ref> The Red army suffered spectacular reverses and sustained massive losses. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops were killed and up to a million and a half taken, prisoner. A quarter of a million men surrendered during the German capture of Kiev, alone.<ref>Antill, p. 18</ref>

The Nazi invasion had been facilitated by the indecisiveness of Stalin, he who was taken aback by Hitler’s betrayal and he . He initially refused to believe the reports of a German invasion. The supreme leader of the Soviets possibly suffered a nervous breakdown in the early stages of the Nazi invasion. However, after a period of time, he was able to lead helped direct the Soviet Countercounter-Attackattack. By the autumn of 1941, it appeared that Germany’s ''blitzkrieg'' tactics would lead to the defeat of the Red army. However, winter arrived early that year and this began to slow slowed down the German advance. Russians spoke of ‘General Winter’- who would help them to win the war. <ref>Bellamy, p. 67</ref> The Soviet people were well aware that the severe Russian winters would slow if not halt the German advance, just as it had stopped Napoleon and Charles XII of Sweden, during previous invasions. By December 1941, the German’s vanguard was ‘some fifty miles from Moscow.’<ref>Antill, p. 45</ref> However, the weather was cold and German soldiers had begun to suffer terribly in the harsh conditions. The Soviet’s used the weather to their advantage. Stalin had The Soviets stationed huge forces in the east in to defend Siberia from a Japanese invasion. He withdrew them and under General George Zhukov . They were then were organized into a strike force aimed at repelling the German advance on Moscow. On December 12th, Zhukov’s army launched a surprise attack on the German frontline and pushed them back with heavy losses some one hundred miles from Moscow.<ref> MacDonald, John. ''Great Battles of World War II'' (London, Michael Joseph books, 1986), p. 245</ref> The Soviet Capital had been saved. However, despite the setback, the Germans had a secure hold over much of the west of the western Soviet Union and had laid siege to the city of Leningrad.

Hitler's General Staff had intended to ‘win the war by Christmas.’ <ref> MacDonald, p, 234</ref> However, despite the check before defeat near Moscow, there was still widespread optimism among the German generals. The German general staff eventually was able to stabilize the German front line and fended off further Soviet attacks during early 1942. Hitler and his generals planned a Spring offensive, that they hoped would lead to Stalin suing for peace or for an outright Soviet surrender. The Germans instead of thrusting forward towards the Soviet capital again, decided to launch an attack on the south. The German army led by the sixth army was to advance into the southern Russian Steppe. Hitler and his army had only a limited access to oil and he believed that if his army could occupy the oil fields then his army could advance possibly into the Middle East. <ref>Antil, p. 115</ref> In the late summer of 1942, the Germany army was in engaged in a rapid advance through southern Russia. It was reminiscent of the early days of Barbarossa. The 6th army was apparently invincible and they defeated a series of Russian divisions and armies. By August, they were on the Volga. Here was near the city of Stalingrad. The city (today Volgograd) had been renamed Stalingrad in honor of Stalin, who had seized the city from the White Counter-Revolutionaries in 1920. <ref>Antil, p. 117</ref>

Hitler then ordered the 6th Army to advance towards Stalingrad and to take the city, even though it had really only symbolic and no lacked strategic value. Hitler was fixated by the idea of capturing Stalingrad and it became his personal obsession and this . This led him to ignore the reality on the ground and this was his general's advice. His foolishness lead to lead the destruction of the German 6th army to disaster. Not only had Hitler divided his forces, but he also allocated too little men and material to the capture of Stalingrad. It was usually accepted at the time and since that an attacking force needs to have at least a 3 to one advantage over the defenders in order to achieve their goals. The Germans did not have any such the necessary numerical advantage over the Soviets.<ref> Beevor, p. 119</ref> This made the 6th army’s prospect of success very uncertain.

Furthermore, Hitler in his obsession to seize the city meant that he was not fully aware of the situation around the city. For example, German forces had been unable to push back Soviet forces during the series of battles known as the Kolton Operations. This was to leave left the Germans very exposed on their flanks as they pressed further into the city and left them at risk of being outflanked. Because Hitler divided the German forces, the flank of the 6th army was insufficiently protected.<ref>Beevor, p. 156</ref> Poorly trained Romanian and Italian forces guarded the flanks and many German commanders privately believed that they could not protect their rear from Soviet attack. Hitler’s determination to capture Stalingrad meant that he dispatched the 6th army on a mission that was unlikely to achieve its objectives and placed it at great risk. Because of his obsession Hitler ignored his generals' advice. Hitler as a result of his s interference and his fixation with Stalingrad he destroyed hampered the 6th Army's throughout the siege of Stalingrad. Hitler's style of leadership was the complete opposite of Stalin's. The Soviet leader, had reformed the Soviet High Command, the ''Stavka'', and granted ‘more autonomy and independence’ to capable generals such as Zhukhov.<ref> Zhukov, Georgiĭ Konstantinovich & Harrison E., Salisbury, ''Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Battles'' (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 116</ref> The leader of the Soviet Union had learned lessons from the early days of Operation Barbarossa. He let his generals do the fighting and draw up the strategies needed to beat the Germans back. <ref>Beevor, p. 178</ref>.

By 1942 , Hitler had largely been very successful in all his campaigns. He had only experienced defeat at the Battle of Britain and before near Moscow. However, on the face of it, neither defeat had stopped the German war machine from going on the offensive and from securing more victories. Hitler, as commander in chief of the army, had great faith in his personal military abilities and as a strategist. He believed that he was a military genius and that he was destined to lead the German people to victory. Central to Hitler’s views on military tactics was that willpower could achieve anything in the battlefield.

The Soviet counteroffensive, which was launched on 19th November, from the Kalmyk Steeped, in a pincer movement, simultaneously attacked the Germans from the North and outflanked the 6th army. Eventually, the Red Army would come to completely encircle the Germans, but this took a week or more to achieve. In this time, Paulus could have retreated west and towards Von Manstein who was fighting in the Crimea .<ref> Anthill, p. 156</ref>. Before the encirclement was complete , Paulus should have left Stalingrad and ordered a retreat. However, because of Hitler and his orders's order to not retreat under any circumstances, Paulus stayed in Stalingrad and he and his army became trapped in the city on the 23rd of November, 1942. Over a quarter of a million Germans had been cut-off in the city on the Volga. Undoubtedly, Paulus own indecisive character played its part, but Hitler’s orders to stand and fight and never to concede ground meant that the Germans did not conduct a tactical retreat and avoid the slow death of the 6th army in the winter of 1942-43.<ref>Beevor, p. 158</ref>

News of the encirclement of the German divisions under Paulus was a severe blow to Hitler and he ordered an immediate attack to relieve the encircled forces in Stalingrad. Goering intervened and believed that the Luftwaffe or German air force could re-supply Paulus’ army. Goering promised Hitler that he would supply the Germans in Stalingrad with all that was needed. In the end, the Luftwaffe’s efforts to supply the besieged forces was totally completely inadequate. It has been estimated that the German air force only dropped one-quarter of the material and the food that the German soldiers needed to fight and survive in the Russian Steppe during the winter.

In February 1943, Von Paulus, surrender surrendered the remaining, starving and ragged German forces in Stalingrad. Finally, he had defied Hitler’s orders to fight to the last man and bullet. The German defeat had been devastating. They had lost half a million, either killed or captured. The Germans after the Soviet victory lost a significant amount of territory in the south of Russia.<ref> Hoyt, p. 211</ref> However, the German army was far from defeated and in early 1943, Von Manstein inflicted a devastating defeat on the Red Army at Kharkov.<ref> Hoyt, p. 2013</ref> However, the German army had lost its aura of invincibility and its enemies were no longer afraid of it and the Soviets believed that it they could be beatendefeat. Furthermore, after Stalingrad, many more Germans became critical of Hitler and his policies, this was particular the case in the German military and there have even been suggestions that after the debacle that the German generals conspired to start a mutiny in the army and depose Hitler.<ref> Beevor, p. 221</ref> However, these plots came to nothingdid not succeed.

Stalingrad was one of the most important battles in WW II if not in entire human history. It was a catastrophic defeat for the German army and it could be argued that they never recovered from the battle. The defeat was avoidable. The main reason for the defeat was that Hitler became obsessed with the idea of capturing the city, named in honor of Stalin. This led him to ignore his Generals warnings and to make several strategic mistakes. The mistakes and errors of Hitler meant that allowed the Soviets could to take advantage of the situation to encircle and annihilate an entire German 6th army. The responsibility for the cataclysmic defeat was Hitler's. Furthermore, he compounded his initial errors, by refusing to allow Paulus to force a way out of Stalingrad his General could have saved some of the German forces, and mitigated the consequences of Hitler’s mistakes. Hitler’ meddling, misguided strategy, and poor tactics meant that the 6th army was doomed to defeat at Stalingrad.